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Creating restoration landscapes: partnerships in large-scale conservation in
the UK
William M. Adams 1, Ian D. Hodge 2, Nicholas A. Macgregor 3,4 and Lindsey C. Sandbrook 1
ABSTRACT. It is increasingly recognized that ecological restoration demands conservation action beyond the borders of existing
protected areas. This requires the coordination of land uses and management over a larger area, usually with a range of partners, which
presents novel institutional challenges for conservation planners. Interviews were undertaken with managers of a purposive sample of
large-scale conservation areas in the UK. Interviews were open-ended and analyzed using standard qualitative methods. Results show
a wide variety of organizations are involved in large-scale conservation projects, and that partnerships take time to create and demand
resilience in the face of different organizational practices, staff  turnover, and short-term funding. Successful partnerships with local
communities depend on the establishment of trust and the availability of external funds to support conservation land uses. We conclude
that there is no single institutional model for large-scale conservation: success depends on finding institutional strategies that secure
long-term conservation outcomes, and ensure that conservation gains are not reversed when funding runs out, private owners change
priorities, or land changes hands.
Key Words: biodiversity conservation; conservation governance; ecological restoration; landscape-scale conservation; neoliberalism;
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INTRODUCTION
The persistence of declines in biodiversity has stimulated
demands for “alternative models for biodiversity conservation”
(Radford 2014:2). Among new approaches proposed, three have
attracted particular attention. First, increasing importance has
been given to ecological restoration, now recognized in the
Convention on Biological Diversity’s Aichi Targets (CBD 2010)
and the 2020 Biodiversity Strategy of the EU (Lammerant et al.
2013). Second, there has been a growing recognition that the
creation of protected areas is no longer the sole responsibility of
the state: nonstate actors, both private landowners and
nongovernmental conservation organizations and trusts, have
become increasingly important (Hodge and Adams 2012). Third,
a consensus has emerged around the need to “scale up”
conservation action and secure larger areas for wildlife protection.
Thus, Fitzsimons and Wescott (2005:75) argue that “to maintain
current levels of biodiversity, it is widely recognized that
conservation efforts cannot be constrained to the public reserve
system and that a landscape-scale approach to management is
required across all land tenures.”  
This reflects research on habitat fragmentation and landscape
connectivity (e.g., Crooks and Sanjayan 2006), and a growing
consensus on the need to create bigger and more connected
conservation areas (e.g., Mansergh et al. 2008), particularly in the
light of anthropogenic climate change (Vos et al. 2008, Heller and
Zavaleta 2009). Conservation organizations currently managing
individual protected areas in isolation should therefore start to
“plan their activities cooperatively on a regional scale”
(Armsworth et al. 2015:165).  
However, while there is some consensus among ecologists on the
desirability of large-scale conservation, the institutional model to
support this is less clearly established. Coordination of land uses
and management over large areas often requires cooperation or
partnership among state and nongovernmental conservation
organizations, communities, and private landowners and
managers (Adams et al. 2014). This presents novel challenges.  
Large-scale conservation or restoration initiatives are variously
referred to as “broad-extent conservation programmes” (Beever
et al. 2014), “multi-tenure reserve networks” (Fitzsimons and
Wescott 2007), large-scale conservation networks (Fitzsimons et
al. 2013), “large-scale conservation areas” (Macgregor et al.
2012), or more generally as “landscape-scale conservation”
(England Biodiversity Group 2011). We refer to all such initiatives
using the term “large-scale conservation areas” (LSCAs).  
We consider the challenges of establishing and managing LSCAs,
drawing on a survey of initiatives in the UK. In the UK, Lawton
et al. (2010) proposed establishment of an ecological network and
associated Ecological Restoration Zones, and the government
announced a new approach to biodiversity conservation focused
on ecological restoration, conservation at a larger “landscape”
scale (defined as “action that covers a large spatial scale, usually
addressing a range of ecosystem processes, conservation
objectives and land uses” [Defra 2011:18]), and a renewed
engagement of private landowners (Adams et al. 2014). In 2012,
12 Nature Improvement Areas were announced in England, which
were partnerships of conservation organizations, local
authorities, local communities, and landowners (Adams et al.
2014). All major conservation NGOs have also established large-
scale conservation programs, mostly designed around their
existing landholdings, including the National Trust, the Royal
Society for the Protection of Birds (“Futurescapes”), and the
Wildlife Trusts (“Living Landscapes” [Adams et al. 2014]).
THE INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF LARGE-SCALE
CONSERVATION
In a neoliberal era, conservation based on land purchase and
regulation by government has been progressively supplemented
by more plural strategies, including private protected areas
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(Hodge and Adams 2012, Stolton et al. 2014). Hybrid
governance, blending public and private interests and
institutions, is promised to combine the benefits of “small
government” with the empowerment of local communities
(McCarthy 2005, Lockie and Higgins 2007). The result is
“institutional blending” (Hodge and Adams 2012), in which
state and private actors interact in novel forms of governance.
This mixes property regimes and different categories of
ownership, the disaggregation and separate allocation of
property rights (e.g., rights of access, to cultivate, to develop),
the development of incentives for conservation management,
and informal arrangements for governance and partnerships.
This is supported through novel patterns of state regulation and
payments (Hodge and Adams 2012).  
The creation of LSCAs is therefore essentially a collective action
problem (Ostrom 1990, 2005), characteristic of the management
of complex environmental resources (Hodge 2016), and
engaging with multiple owners and stakeholders from public
and private sectors. LSCAs therefore demand some element of
comanagement (Berkes 2009), where the processes of
governance are shared among a group of stakeholders from
government, private organizations, and civil society. Emerson
et al. (2012) propose an integrative framework for collaborative
governance, involving three elements: first, a process of
“principled engagement,” in which actors with different goals
work across institutional, sectoral, or jurisdictional boundaries;
second, shared motivation (a self-reinforcing cycle of mutual
trust, understanding, internal legitimacy, and commitment);
third, joint action to achieve outcomes unreachable without
collaboration.  
In the UK, some initiatives to promote collective management
of land-based resources arise through specific government
programs (e.g., River Basin District Liaison Panels [Cook et al.
2012]), or institutions for integrated catchment management
(Short 2015), while others represent more ad hoc groupings
(Benson et al. 2013). Both approaches have been used to create
LSCAs, with various kinds of partnerships among state, private
sector, and nongovernmental organizations. The common aim
of such comanagement is to bring a range of resources and
capabilities together at a local level to achieve social objectives.
Advantages of the approach include access to the skills and
specialisms of different organizations and individuals and their
networks, to different resources (e.g., administrative capability),
and to larger and more diverse areas of land, and the
opportunity to share risks (Carlsson and Berkes 2005).  
In the UK, LSCA projects take several forms. Some are single
large landholdings, effectively standing alone as protected areas.
Examples include private estates—for example, the private
Knepp Estate (Sussex, England)—or a number of estates in
Scotland (e.g., Rothiemurchus, Glenfeshie, Corrour), where the
owner (often a family trust) has made a commitment to
conservation. Conservation NGOs have acquired many large
properties; for example, the National Trust (e.g., the Wicken
Vision Area in England), the Royal Society for the Protection
of Birds (RSPB) (e.g., reserves at Abernethy or Forsinard Flows
in Scotland), the National Trust for Scotland (e.g., Mar Lodge,
or the Isle of Canna), or the John Muir Trust (e.g., Sandwood
Bay, Scotland). In these cases, the “partnerships” involve
primarily neighbors, funders, and scientific and government
organizations.  
Several LSCA partnerships include multiple ownerships. Two
kinds exist in the UK. The first involves collaboration between
partners who contribute their own properties; for example, Wild
Ennerdale in Cumbria (Browning and Yannik 2004), a
collaboration between an NGO (the National Trust), a
government agency (Forestry Commission), and a private water
company (United Utilities). Some such collaborations can involve
larger numbers of partners; for example, the Coigach and Assynt
Living Landscape in northwest Scotland, which was formed by
four NGOs or trusts (the Scottish Wildlife Trust and John Muir
Trust, Assynt Foundation, and Culag Community Woodland
Trust) and three private landowners (Adams 2012). The second
kind of multipartner LSCA involves a specific area or zone with
large numbers of landowners whom the initiative seeks to engage
in conservation activity. The NGO-led Wildlife Trust Living
Landscapes and RSPB Futurescapes are this kind of LSCA.  
LSCA partnerships are predominantly established informally,
often by conservation NGOs. Without statutory authority or
powers, these projects aim to influence land management within
identified areas toward a wider social interest. Some LSCA
initiatives involve collaborations between conservation landowners
(governmental, nongovernmental, or private). Such conservation
organizations might be expected to collaborate readily, although
in fact, coordination of action between conservation
organizations is not necessarily simple, even if  they have similar
goals.  
In industrialized countries (especially in western Europe), rural
land is mostly privately owned and often intensively farmed. Here,
the success of LSCAs depends on persuading a sufficient number
of private owners to change their management to favor
conservation. The number of owners involved depends both on
the scale of the initiative and on ecology. In the UK, hill and
moorland areas tend to be in larger land units, managed
extensively for shooting, grazing, or forestry. By contrast, in
lowland areas, holdings tend to be smaller and land use is
dominated by intensive agriculture. Here, the delivery of LSCAs
demands coordination of independent land managers (c.f.
Pasquini et al. 2011, Lacher and Wilkinson 2013). For these
owners, conservation is not necessarily a major interest, and
partnerships may need to address fundamental differences in
motivation (Emerson et al. 2012).
METHODS
To explore the establishment, activities, and challenges of LSCAs,
we interviewed 27 people in leadership positions in a large-scale
initiative in the UK, between January and September 2012.
Interviewees had various management or coordinating roles, and
are referred to here generically as “managers.” Initiatives were
selected from a database of 800 large-scale conservation initiatives
in England, Wales, and Scotland, compiled by Southampton
University (Macgregor et al. 2012, Eigenbrod et al., in press).
These initiatives were stratified on the basis of size (10–49 km2,
50–990 km2, and > 1000 km2) and number of landholders (10 or
fewer, or more than 10). Within these categories, initiatives were
selected purposively, taking account of geographical diversity (the
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range of environments across the UK), nature of lead
organization (government and nongovernment), and logistics
(time and travel costs). The final sample of 27 was made up of 16
initiatives in England, eight in Scotland, and three in Wales.  
Managers of selected initiatives were contacted by telephone or
email. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face (n = 23), the
rest by phone or Skype (n = 4). We conducted indepth interviews
using a common schedule of questions that explored the three
elements identified by Emerson et al. (2012), devised in
collaboration with a panel of researchers and practitioners
involved in related research (Eigenbrod et al., in press). The
approach was inductive, and looked for common approaches and
challenges across the sample cases. Questions included contextual
information (objectives and design of the project, the ecological
factors driving its design, and sources of information) and focused
on the institutions and practices of collaborative governance (the
creation and maintenance of partnerships, arrangements,
decision-making, conflict resolution, relations with landowners).
Questions were open-ended and shared with interviewees before
the interview. An attempt was made to create a rapport with the
interviewees, so they could use their own words to clarify and
explain complex issues and include topics not in the original list.
By agreement, all interviews were recorded and transcribed
verbatim. Interviews were transcribed, and coded using Atlas.ti
to identify and group passages on a common theme, and then
themes across interviews were linked. All quotes are anonymous,
and are identified by a unique code number. Where organizations
were named by respondents, an arbitrary set of initials is used in
the text (e.g., organization XXX or YYY); these initials are not
specific to any given organization. All information on named
initiatives in this paper was derived from published or Web-based
sources.
RESULTS
Diversity of partnerships
A number of different kinds of organization were involved in the
initiatives surveyed, including individual landowners (from small
farms up to large estates), charities, trusts, nongovernmental
organizations, clubs, research institutions, national conservation
agencies, utilities, and private companies (e.g., mining companies;
ports; railway, water, and energy companies).  
Interviewees used the term “partner” in three distinct ways. They
distinguished between (i) “project partners,” meaning close
collaborators involved in the management of the initiative; (ii)
“community partners,” referring to landholders in the initiative
area whose collaboration (especially in land management
decisions) was essential to conservation outcomes; and (iii)
“institutional partners,” meaning broader stakeholders who
could bring other resources, such as funding, scientific expertise,
or administrative capacity. We focus primarily on the first two.
Creating partnerships
The creation of partnerships requires a high degree of pragmatism
from different actors: interviewees emphasized the need to be
realistic about what partnerships could achieve (“it’s about
making partnerships that make sense instead of partnerships for
the sake of a partnership” [Interview 12]), and that it took time
to establish effective multipartner initiatives, to build trust
between organizations and individuals. It was clear that it took
constant attention to move from trust to coordinated joint action
(c.f. Emerson et al. 2012). One manager said of a funding bid,
“after I submitted the application, I found out that [organization
XXX] had submitted an application for doing virtually the same
thing about five miles away…when [the funder] saw this they said,
‘Oh: not working in partnership; bunch of clowns!’” (Interview
6).  
The idea of large-scale conservation could provide the catalyst to
combine previously separate nature reserves into one program,
and to move passive cooperation into active collaboration.
Projects were often built around pre-existing initiatives. One
manager said, “The wider partnership project, as opposed to just
the [organization’s]…started in 2005 by the landowners, kind of
completely separately…there was [another organization’s] project
as well, that started before the landowners’ one and that’s been
amalgamated” (Interview 11).  
Partnerships brought diverse strengths (c.f. Carlsson and Berkes
2005): “You know, [organization XXX] are obviously interested
in ancient trees and native woodland, [organization YYY] are
getting that way, they may be a bit more recreational now but with
a commercial side as well…and then [organization ZZZ] are all
for the habitat and the bird life and everything so…It’s great
having all three” (Interview 25). Larger projects were seen by some
managers as providing more security (more organizations to find
financial resources or solve other problems, for example).
However, some respondents thought that in larger partnerships,
relatively less got achieved.
Sustaining partnerships
Having set up an LSCA partnership, the challenge is to sustain
it. Many initiatives had a single “lead partner” that led decision-
making. Often this went with financial responsibility for a grant
that enabled project work to be done. One manager commented,
“Yeah. I think it’s safe to say that we are the people with the
money…at the moment” [Interview 27]. Sometimes individual
organizations retain decision-making powers over zones within a
wider project that they previously controlled: “it is us leading, and
it’s us saying ‘this is what we’re going to do,’ and that’s fine”
(Interview 11). Other managers wished to avoid taking a
dominant role: “We’re trying to make it less of a dominant
partnership” (Interview 22).  
However, relationships among partners can be problematic.
Different working arrangements, for example over accounting,
can create tensions. One initiative manager noted that “charities
are allowed to claim full cost recovery on costs for staff. Public
sector partners are not allowed to claim any staff  time at all”
(Interview 21), which makes it difficult to compare work done by
different partners. It is not always easy to get along: one manager
said, “[organization XXX] have been a very, very difficult
organization to engage with. Their organizational structure is
impenetrable. You don’t understand who reports to who, how the
departments fit together, the language they use is awful”
(Interview 6). Relations are not always harmonious: one
respondent said, “we’ve had our fingers slightly burnt with
[organization YYY] because they did take the work that was
done…and almost hold it up as a [project of their own]…But then
you don’t want to end up in the position that you completely burn
your bridges…” (Interview 1). Another respondent commented
simply, with respect to other partners, “we’re careful about what
we say” (Interview 11).
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Formal structures
There was variation in the degree to which initiatives involved
formal agreements to tie partners together. Many initiatives had
started informally. One manager said, “So all the project site
owners, we got them to say, ‘yes, we support this project,’ without,
you know, committing themselves…it’s word of mouth rather
than a formal agreement” (Interview 4).  
Some partnerships remained informal (one respondent said,
“we’re not technically a partnership because we don’t have a bank
account and, you know, all that sort of stuff…we used to call it
a partnership but I now call it a project” [Interview 25]). Other
initiatives had some kind of informal written agreement: “I
wouldn’t say it’s quite formalized, it’s a page and a half  of A4…It
was a case of…having the document in place to bring the three
partners together…Again, that took time…I think about a year
and a half  in total” (Interview 9). One initiative had a master plan
(“a massive document”) that “no one has formally signed up to,
but everyone has pretty much…agreed that this is the direction
that we want the project to go in” (Interview 11). The same project
had an “officially agreed publicity statement” and “an official
project partner logo”: the manager commented, “that’s, sort of,
as formal as it gets” (Interview 11).  
Some found that a legal agreement eventually became necessary
to commit partners financially: one manager said, “I think
probably the project got to the point where commitment had to
be expressed in financial terms” (Interview 8). Formal
arrangements often resulted from the demands of funding bodies.
“What [organization XXX] require is that each organization who
becomes a partner, there is a partnership agreement and that must
be signed off  at senior management level within the organizations,
so that there is high level commitment at a corporate level from
the partners” (Interview 21).
Promoting resilience
Partnership arrangements need constant attention, as
circumstances or the priorities of partner organizations change,
in a process of adaptive comanagement (Armitage et al. 2009).
Learning from social-ecological feedback in the project area, or
responses to changes of staff  in partner organizations, demand a
dynamic approach to partnerships. Processes of review differed
in formality and extent. One interviewee commented, “We are
intending to refresh and update that memorandum; we just
haven’t got around to it yet” (Interview 7). Some initiatives
reviewed partners at intervals. One did so every two or three years,
asking, “Who are the stakeholders, the people who are interested
in what we’re doing? When did we last engage with them? Have
people within those groups changed?…Do we need to re-engage
with that group to make sure that [a] senior manager or [a]
particularly influential person is up to speed on what we’re
doing?” (Interview 9). Some initiatives do achieve periods of
stability: “We had a project Steering Group…and we would go
back to them every year and check. But I think it’s fair to say that
the Steering Group was quite involved in the early stages, and
then backed off  and were happy to leave us to get on with it [in a
three-year project]…” [Interview 2]. But there will need to be more
intensive activity in order to renew the funding and re-establish
the partnership for a further period.  
Restructuring demands flexibility. One respondent commented,
“the biggest threat to [the initiative] is organizational change, and
one of the partners being transformed into something else”
(Interview 9). Many initiatives had changed over time, and with
them the composition of the partnership. For example, one
respondent described how an existing partnership was reformed
in order to make an Nature Improvement Area bid: “With the
new structure they are putting into place, I imagine we will be one
of the actual partners in this bigger partnership. But [organization
XXX], they sort of take charge of that partnership…direct and
oversee decisions made” (Interview 3).  
The biggest driver of change in partnerships was lack of
continuity in funding, described by one respondent as “the big
stumbling block” (Interview 26). While one might expect LSCAs
to be planned as long-term projects, in practice few could look
ahead more than a few years. This is an example of
“projectification,” where policy initiatives have to be developed
rapidly and with limited time horizons, thereby demanding great
adaptability (Sjöblom and Godenhjelm 2009, Sjöblom et al.
2013). Everywhere, LSCAs were supported by short-term
funding. Follow-on funds, to support a successful initiative, were
often not available. One respondent commented, “With
[landscape-scale projects], people fund them, and then they say,
‘fantastic, it’s a great success—we can never fund it again. You’ve
shown what works, now we can’t pay for that, you have to do
something different” (Interview 2). As a result, projects sometimes
just stopped: “unfortunately, that was just before everything
went…wrong with the world, just because funding was drying
up” (Interview 28). And with funding goes job security for key
staff. One respondent commented, “I mean, if  we get this Heritage
Lottery Fund my post continues for a period of time as well, but
if  it doesn’t…” (Interview 25).  
Many initiatives obtain funds from agri-environment schemes or
other general countryside grant schemes. The short-term nature
of project funding is a problem here too because conservation
outcomes cannot be switched on and off: “if  you want the
outcomes, you need a relationship both with individual
landowners and with the landowning community, and that
happens over decades” (Interview 6).
Community partners
Given the requirement for a long-term commitment, relationships
with local communities, and especially landowners, are critical.
Metcalf  et al. (2015) note the importance of trust in restoration
projects, but also that at a large-scale, trust is both more important
and more difficult to develop. It is therefore critical to engage
those who have direct control over the land—generally the local
farmers: “it’s about finding the influential farmers, and talking
to them and getting them on our side, or at least willing to talk
about it and using that as a network” (Interview 12). This is,
however, often not easy: “It’s quite easy to get to people that are
interested…it’s the farmers that…have slightly less interest…how
do you engage with them?” (Interview 12).  
Trust takes time to develop, but landowners can become frustrated
with slow decision-making and the long-term nature of ecological
outcomes (Metcalf  et al. 2015). Moreover, the long-term aims of
an initiative may not match the plans of local landowners and
organizations who are asked to commit their land and resources
or their thinking about future uncertainty.  
In the UK, efforts in LSCAs often focus on persuading farmers
to enter an agri-environment scheme: “quite a lot of the work is
Ecology and Society 21(3): 1
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss3/art1/
to do with supporting farmers getting into agri-environment
schemes and then helping them to…optimize their work within
agri-environment agreements” [Interview 7]. Another respondent
said, “So, obviously, if  we’re trying to influence conservation on
a landscape scale in these other areas, our only hook that we have
or our only tool is SRDP [Scottish Rural Development
Programme, which includes government agri-environment
schemes]” (Interview 26).  
But it may not be straightforward to make the links between
landowner and funding scheme. Such schemes tend to be
bureaucratic, with complex and intimidating forms for each
landowner to complete. Thus, one manager said of the Scottish
Rural Development Programme, simply, “well, SRDP is a real
minefield…” (Interview 26). Another noted that the
smallholdings on which areas of conservation interest occurred
were not well served by the SRDP, not scoring enough “points”
to win funding: “they fall between two stools in fact; they’re not
classed as woodland and they’re not classed as agriculture and
grazing” (Interview 21).  
Beever et al. (2014) note that LSCA projects often have aims that
extend well beyond just biodiversity. Attempts to engage with the
broader needs and interests of local communities have led some
large-scale initiatives in surprising directions: one became
involved in the development of a microhydro project; the manager
hoped it would “bring in some long-term revenue to put back into
the core project” (Interview 27). Such diversification can
potentially be a distraction for project staff. One respondent
commented, “So, we’ve just produced an education resource for
secondary schools which is linked to the curriculum for excellence,
so that’s…that’s me going out. We produced a DVD…and we’re
just putting a web site together. So, all those sorts of things, totally
fall on my shoulders” (Interview 25).
DISCUSSION
The shift toward large-scale conservation represents a significant
reterritorialization of the conservation landscape (Adams et al.
2014), and involves a major role for private landowners and
NGOs. This may be seen in the wider context of neoliberalization,
which creates “multiple sites of governing” and “decenters the
state as the seat of power: power bleeds across the social body in
such a way that governing occurs in multiple sites and through a
myriad of techniques” (Rutherford 2007:291). It offers new
mechanisms for conservation but also creates new risks and
challenges. Large-scale conservation demands institutional
architectures that blend governmental and private tenure and
management, thus creating hybrid institutions, and evolving
partnerships between state and nonstate actors.  
The creation of LSCAs involves establishing a vision that reflects
and responds to stakeholder goals and values. It needs social
entrepreneurship in order to engage with potential partners who
can provide the land, resources, and skills, and to gain their
commitment and motivation toward these wider ambitions, and
to persuade them to implement changes in land use over sustained
periods of time that will bring about desired outcomes. These are
roles not always easily undertaken by government. But the large-
scale conservation movement is in a relatively early stage in its
development. It has opened up significant potential and had some
success at the level of individual initiatives (Ellis et al. 2012) but
has yet to deliver widespread, well-documented, and sustainable
conservation outcomes.  
The creation and operation of successful large-scale partnerships,
like other forms of comanagement, demand substantial and
continuing commitment of time and resources. The cost of
restoration and conservation is often central to discussions
between initiative managers and community partners.
Conservation outcomes on LSCAs often require land uses that
are, almost by definition, less profitable for landowners. In other
words, conservation involves an opportunity cost, as well as a
direct cost, both of land management and administration and
facilitation. Coordination of actions by landowners and
investment in landscape restoration cannot be expected to occur
spontaneously. Funding needs to be secured to cover costs on a
continuing basis to achieve and maintain buy-in. This is a
continuing and adaptive process that demands constant
engagement and renewal.  
At present, arrangements for large-scale conservation in the UK
tend to be ad hoc and rely on funding from sources not designed
for this purpose, especially agri-environment payments to
landholders. This is a source of considerable administrative
burden, instability, and uncertainty as to the capability and
sustainability of initiatives to deliver over the long period of time
required for conservation and ecological restoration. Funding for
the facilitation and administration of the initiatives is obtained
predominantly through projects that have to be invented to meet
the demands of external sponsors. These may not align closely
with the core mission of the initiative. They may then have to be
reinvented in a different form to have a chance of continuation.  
This pattern reflects the phenomenon of projectification in rural
conservation (c.f. Sjöblom and Godenhjelm 2009, Sjöblom et al.
2013). State and charitable funders allocate funds competitively
to projects with defined objectives for limited periods of time. The
aim is to promote flexibility, accountability, and efficiency, and
to direct a variety of actors to address defined objectives together
(Sjöblom and Godenhjelm 2009). But these characteristics
conflict with some of the key conservation requirements of the
LSCA initiatives. Long-term continuity is required in order to
deliver conservation outcomes. This continuity is disrupted by
short project cycles, which work against the potential to build
social capital and trust among the partners and the long-term
changes in land management that are required to achieve
significant ecological changes. Projectification also increases
transaction costs—costs that are generally not considered by
funders. Further, it is inconsistent with the more “open-ended”
approach that is indicated by adaptive management (Hughes et
al. 2011). Sponsored projects are generally required to set
quantitative objectives and milestones from the start that can be
demonstrated to have been achieved by the end. In contrast, an
adaptive approach will shift its emphasis as information is gained
through the implementation of the project.  
Agri-environment contracts are a major source of funding for
LSCAs (e.g., Utes and Matzdorf 2013, Hodge 2014) awarded to
landscape partners. Agri-environment payments play a key role
in securing biodiversity targeted land management interventions
by landowners, operating within a broad regulatory framework
designed as part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under
other pressures and with different priorities (Hodge et al. 2015).
Some, but not all, agri-environment agreements are targeted on
local biodiversity objectives, which may or may not coincide with
LSCA objectives. And, being based on relatively short voluntary
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agreements, they cannot be guaranteed to offer the particular
incentives or continuity required for LSCAs. More generally, the
availability of funds is dependent on agreement among EU
member states on the way in which the CAP is funded into the
future.  
Agri-environment payments may be seen as one form of Payments
for Ecosystem Services (PES) (Engel et al. 2008, Matzdorf et al.
2013). In future, it is possible that market-based mechanisms, such
as PES, could become an important alternative source of funding,
potentially through reform of the CAP (Plieninger et al. 2012) or
through independent approaches. Partnerships might be able to
diversify and secure their funding through the delivery of services
to other beneficiaries. This implies that initiatives should develop
a broader scope for their activities across other ecosystems
services, such as habitat banking, flood protection, carbon
storage, energy generation, or water purification (Defra 2014).
This would require a more market-oriented approach that might
challenge the approach that is taken toward ecological
restoration.  
Public conservation goals require an active and interventionist
government to steer social and economic processes toward
publicly desired outcomes and to stimulate market incentives that
advance social interests. Neoliberalism may be seen as opening
out the opportunities, but we see state re-engagement as a further
stage that might be regarded as postneoliberal (Hodge and Adams
2014). To secure the public interest in nature, governments need
to explore a wider set of policy instruments designed specifically
for large-scale and long-term restoration efforts (e.g.,
conservation covenants [Hodge 2013]). The interplay of public
and private investments and benefits will be critical. It will be
particularly important to identify and support institutional
arrangements that bring successful and sustainable outcomes,
including funding arrangements that allow lower administrative
costs. Ultimately, the success of large-scale conservation depends
on finding institutional strategies that secure long-term
conservation outcomes, thus ensuring that conservation gains are
not reversed when money runs out, private owners change
priorities, or land changes hands.
CONCLUSIONS
The survey of LSCA partnerships in England, Scotland, and
Wales reveals the progress being made toward a novel approach
to ecological restoration. At this stage, it is too early to know the
extent to which the approach can deliver long-term ecological
change. There are significant institutional challenges.
Partnerships face challenges in envisioning, incentivizing, and
sustaining initiatives to alter land management practices across a
landscape scale. There is no single model suited to supporting the
creation of LSCAs activity. The appropriate model will vary
depending on local conservation requirements, as well as on local
land tenure and farm practices, on the capabilities of civil society
and local government, on potential sources of funding, and on
government policy more generally. The neoliberal state aims to
distance itself  from direct engagement with land use decisions
and hopes that biodiversity decline will be reversed through the
largely spontaneous actions of private actors and civil society.  
The achievements of LSCAs in the UK to date flow largely from
the initiatives of conservation bodies supported by the resources
that they have been able to command and through the somewhat
opportunistic availability of agri-environment measures. This is
unlikely to be sustainable. More research is needed to explore the
diversity of approaches toward LSCA partnerships that are being
adopted to identify the relative successes of different
arrangements. But government policy also needs to support the
development of institutional and funding arrangements that can
combine long-term sustainability with public accountability.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/8498
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